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Per se rules in the antitrust analysis
of horizontal restraints
BY JONATHAN B. BAKER*
Restrictions among competitors, or horizontal restraints, raise the
specter of the very trusts that the antitrust laws were enacted to
prevent. They call forth an image of collusion among rivals to
restrict output and raise price, still the paradigm case of an unlaw-
ful restraint on trade. But today this image competes with a sec-
ond, more benign picture: of firms working together to reduce
production costs, to lower consumer search or transaction costs,
and to create new products. As Langenfeld and Morris' empha-
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Department of Justice. These remarks were originally prepared as a discus-
sion of papers by Paul T. Denis, and James A. Langenfeld and John R. Mor-
ris, at the 1990 meeting of the Western Economic Association. The author is
indebted to Paul Denis and Bobby Willig for helpful discussions.
I Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agreements Among Competitors:
What Does the Future Hold? 36 AnTruST Buu.. 651 (1991). Langenfeld
and Morris' primary interest is to demonstrate that competing members of a
trade association can achieve market power through association rules that
merely raise marginal costs for all association members, even though those
rules do not directly affect price. While each competitor experiences higher
costs, each can profit when the collective enforcement of the association
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size, often both images are grounded in reality. Accordingly, in
reviewing horizontal restraints, courts are frequently forced to
weigh the harm from any exercise of market power against the
benefits of any efficiencies generated.
This task is structured by a set of legal rules: some practices
are held illegal per se, and others are analyzed for their reason-
ableness. Paul Denis2 interprets the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions reviewing horizontal restraints as preserving a sharp
distinction between these categories. In contrast, other commenta-
tors argue that the Supreme Court discarded the per se rule
entirely in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. (BMI)3 and National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents (NCAA), 4 and, in consequence, that all horizon-
tal restraints are now analyzed through application of some form
rule leads to lower output and, consequently, higher prices for the services
provided by the association as a whole.
Langenfeld and Morris show further that there is no reason to expect
new competition to solve the resulting competitive problem. Free entry into
the association does not force down the market price when all new entrants
must adhere to the cost-raising rules that incumbent competitors must fol-
low. Association membership typically confers substantial benefits (for
example, access to multiple listing service real estate listings, or quality cer-
tification through membership in a respected professional organization), so
entrants do not choose the alternative of selling services without association
membership.
Langenfeld and Morris point out that this "raising rivals' costs" interpre-
tation of association rules is predicated on the absence of close competitors
for the services provided by association members (i.e., the association must
constitute an antitrust market). They also emphasize that the same rules that
may permit the exercise of market power may also generate socially valuable
efficiencies. Nevertheless, association rules can have harmful consequences
for competition, so they are appropriate subjects for antitrust review.
2 Denis, Focusing on the Characterization of Per Se Unlawful
Restraints, 36 ANTITuST BuLL. 641 (1991).
3 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
4 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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of the rule of reason.5 Remarkably, after a century of judicial
experience analyzing horizontal restraints under the Sherman Act,
the legal rules under which they are reviewed remain in dispute.
I. The emperor has no clothes: on the judicial methodology
for creating per se rules
Even if the antitrust community could agree on the list of
practices antitrust law should proscribe, were it always possible
and sensible to conduct a case-by-case analysis, the task of speci-
fying the rules courts should apply would be incomplete without
resolving how to formulate the legal rule. The latter task cannot
be undertaken without first answering the general question: When
should antitrust law ask a court to declare business practices ille-
gal without a full-scale factual investigation of their effect under
the rule of reason, as through application of a per se rule?
This question is far from academic. Since 1977, one plausible
year for dating the start of the antitrust's Chicago school revolu-
tion,6 much judicial effort has been spent reconsidering per se cat-
egories in the law of horizontal restraints. Yet even a casual
review of the leading cases calls into question whether courts
have a completely coherent theory of when to create rules that
structure what would otherwise be a rule of reason analysis. 7
5 Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859 (1989);
see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TExAs L. REv. 1, 19 (1984)
("Under NCAA the defendant may offer an economic justification even of
a 'naked' restraint").
6 In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). For descriptions of the changes
wrought by the Chicago school revolution, see Calvani & Silbarium,
Antitrust Today: Maturity or Decline, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 123 (1990);
Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago
School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 645 n.1 (1989); Baker, Book
Review, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 919 (1989).
7 Moreover, this procedural question has obvious substantive conse-
quences. As Denis emphasizes, "characterization of a practice as subject
to the per se rule means that the plaintiff is more likely to win the case."
Supra note 2, at 644.
736 : The antitrust bulletin
One reason courts appear unsettled in analyzing this important
doctrinal area is that many of the categories themselves are in
flux. In the past decade and a half, for example, the Supreme
Court has felt free to overrule a per se rule,8 qualify another,9 and
narrow a third.'0 In addition, courts and commentators have cre-
ated a dazzling variety of "structured inquiries" and "quick look"
approaches to circumscribe the factual inquiry required by a full-
blown analysis of reasonableness. The Supreme Court has
instructed that tying may be proscribed without a full rule of rea-
son analysis if, after characterization of the conduct as tying, a
court also finds coercion or forcing;" group boycotts may be pro-
scribed without a full rule of reason analysis if, after characteriza-
tion of the conduct as a group boycott, a court also finds market
power;' 2 and horizontal price fixing may be proscribed without a
full rule of reason analysis if, after characterization of the conduct
8 GTE Sylvania (overruling U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967)).
9 BMI (a per se prohibition does not always apply to price fixing).
l0 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717 (1988) (narrowing the per se prohibition of vertical price fixing). The
per se rule against group boycotts may also have been narrowed. FTC v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists (IFD), 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (distin-
guishing instant case because the per se prohibition of group boycotts is
"limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott supplies or
customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a com-
petetitor").
11 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Although the per se violation has long been thought to require both proof
of coercion or forcing and proof of market power after characterization,
see ABA ANTrrRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 81-88 (2d
ed. 1984), in Jefferson Parish these separate requirements may have been
collapsed. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-18.
12 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). In addition, per se analysis of group
boycotts must be predicated on a showing that the purpose of the boycott
is to discourage customers or suppliers from doing business with a com-
petitor. IFD, 476 U.S. at 458.
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as horizontal price fixing, no new product is created.' 3 The Fed-
eral Trade Commission prohibits horizontal restraints without
undertaking a full analysis of their reasonableness if the practice
is inherently suspect and if no efficiency justification is
plausible. 4 Judge Easterbrook has proposed that courts apply "fil-
ters" to screen horizontal restraints, 5 and the Justice Department
has endorsed a "quick look" approach of its own. 16 While these
rules require something more than an unstructured rule of reason,
they deviate from the traditional per se approach because they do
not require courts to cease their factual inquiry and find a viola-
tion once the practice is found to fit the category.'
7
Perhaps the most important reason that courts appear to be
unsettled in performing horizontal restraints analysis is that the
justifications the Supreme Court routinely provides for creating
per se rules are unconvincing explanations for the use of struc-
tured inquiries. The Court has stated repeatedly that per se rules
are created in order to reduce litigation costs and increase busi-
ness certainty about forbidden conduct, and that they are applied
only to conduct that is manifestly and plainly anticompetitive. 8
13 BMI; see NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101, 109-110 (proof of market power
is not necessary to condemn the practice); cf. IFD, 476 U.S. at 460-61
(market power is a "surrogate for detrimental effects").
14 Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549
(1988); cf. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 & 104 n.2 (treating per se rule as estab-
lishing a presumption); see Muris, supra note 5. The Mass. Board
approach is discussed in detail in Langenfeld & Morris, supra note 1.
15 Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 14.
16 U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109,
at 29,594 (1988).
17 The structured inquiry involving presumptions and burden-shifting
suggested by the Court in NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113, is reminiscent of the
structured inquiry previously applied by the Court to one common type of
horizontal restraint: horizontal mergers. U.S. v. Philadelphia National
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
1I See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S.
332, 343-44 (1981); GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 n.16; NCAA, 435 U.S.
at 692. This explanation is accepted by Denis, supra note 2, at 645-46,
and by Langenfeld & Morris, supra note 1, at 667.
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Yet the business certainty and litigation cost reduction benefits of
per se rules are easy to overstate. The fight over characteriza-
tion-determining whether the conduct is in the appropriate
pigeonhole 9 -can involve as much cost, and generate as little
business certainty, as a full-blown analysis of reasonableness.
2 0
Moreover, the Court undermines its own contention that struc-
tured inquiries are invoked only when practices are clearly anti-
competitive with its constant questioning of that position, as
through the following statements: "there is often no bright line
separating per se from rule of reason analysis . ... "21 "easy
labels do not always supply ready answers," and "[e]xactly what
types of activity fall within the forbidden category is . . . far
from certain." 23 Similarly, the Court has remarked that the distinc-
tions it must make in order to determine whether to use a per se
rule are "reasonably clear [in theory]" but "often. . . difficult to
apply in practice."24 These admissions undercut the stated judicial
efficiency rationale for per se rules.25 Thus, by admitting that it
19 As part of the battle over characterization, defendants seeking to
avoid per se treatment may also argue that in the event the practice is
found to be within a per se category, it would be appropriate to create an
exception to the per se rule. Litigation over this contention adds to the
expense and uncertainty of the characterization fight.
20 See BMI, 441 U.S. at 9 (characterization is "not always. . . a sim-
ple matter"). The BMI Court rejected as simplistic and overbroad a literal
approach of identifying practices subject to per se treatment by simply
asking whether competitors had "fixed" a "price." Id. at 9. The Court
admitted that it must analyze "the effect and. . . the purpose of the prac-
tice" to characterize it, id. at 19, though it contended that this scrutiny is
less "burdensome" than a rule of reason analysis because it is undertaken
"facially" and only after "considerable [judicial] experience" with the
practice. Id. at 19 & 19 n.33.
21 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26.
22 BMI, 441 U.S. at 8.
23 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 284 U.S. at 294.
24 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984).
25 When the probable judicial outcome of a lawsuit is evident to the
parties before litigation begins, the controversy is likely to be settled
before trial. For this reason, those disputes reaching trial will on average
be those with the most uncertain outcomes, regardless of the legal rules
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experiences a pervasive uncertainty about the bounds of struc-
tured inquiries, and serious difficulty in applying per se cate-
gories, the Supreme Court calls into question its own explanations
for its use of per se rules.
II. Structured inquiries after the rise of the Chicago school
In retrospect, the 1950's and 1960's could be called the
"golden age" of the antitrust per se rule.26 Not coincidentally,
these were the years during which antitrust thinking was charac-
terized by a consensus around the structural model. 27 The
Supreme Court embedded the structural model in the per se rules
of the earlier era, in order to give lower courts, lawyers, and
enforcers signposts to follow as they work through the implica-
tions of that consensus for identifying the legal rules that will be
employed in individual cases. 28 The renewed interest in structured
inquiries today most likely reflects the development of a new con-
sensus around the economic approach to antitrust pioneered by
employed to decide them. Even taking into account this selection bias, the
Supreme Court's remarkable series of admissions appear to reflect a gen-
uine difficulty with characterization under the per se rule.
2 E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1985) (tying); White
Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (territorial and customer
restraints on distributors); U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967) (exclusive distribution territories). One commentator observes
that before 1977, "case after case instructed us that there was an ever-
widening category of plainly anticompetitive practices that could not be
justified, no matter how reasonable-[the per se rule] was in the ascen-
dancy." Malina, Antitrust in the Supreme Court-1988, at 57 AN=rrRusT
L.J. 257, 257-58 (1988).
27 Baker, Book Review, supra note 6. According to the structural
model, the exercise of market power is rendered more likely by increases
in market concentration.
28 Under this theory, antitrust per se rules simplify the intellectual
task of identifying the rule that is to be applied, without reducing the
costs of determining whether a rule has been violated. Their advantage is
in helping judges and lawyers identify the rule that will apply to a case,
not in reducing litigation costs or improving business certainty about the
judical treatment of firm conduct.
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the Chicago school.29 But the precise formulation of rules that
describe the new consensus is the subject of debate.30
29 From a law and economics perspective, per se rules may be pre-
ferred to a rule of reason when violations are expensive for a court to
observe but are strongly correlated with observable behaviors that are
cheaply observed, and when it would be expensive for a violator to
break the law without engaging in the observable behavior. Under such
circumstances, the judicial system would minimize enforcement costs by
conditioning liability on the cheaply observable behavior, and the result-
ing enforcement errors, corporate compliance costs, and social costs of
deterring socially beneficial actions, would not produce a substantial
efficiency loss.
From this perspective, the current ferment in the law of horizontal
restraints involves an attempt to identify certain behaviors-readily
observable and nonmanipulable correlates of harmful conduct-on
which to condition legal liability. Unfortunately, the behaviors that have
been proposed may be nearly as costly to observe as the violation itself.
Market power, an obvious candidate as a building block for per se
rules, is a troublesome concept because, while market share is typically
observable given a market definition, the link between market share and
market power is contested. See Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About
Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Gold-
schmid, H.M. Mann, & J.F. Weston, eds. 1974); cf. U.S. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (a high market share may
reflect superior skill and industry, or market power).
Recently, the BMI majority has proposed the creation of a new prod-
uct or large efficiency as a readily observable behavior on which a per
se rule could be based. The BMI dissent, however, exposed the practical
difficulties of observing the behavior on which application of the pro-
posed structured inquiry is conditioned by presenting evidence that the
horizontal restraint created neither a new product nor a large efficiency
unavailable without the restraint. 441 U.S. at 30 (describing the compet-
itive market for film "synch" rights).
30 So long as the primary debate among judges and commentators
concerns the best way to formulate legal rules in order to reflect Chicago
school understandings, the main judicial task is to rationalize the prece-
dents of the last 15 years through the creation of structured inquiries. But
to the extent new developments in economics transform or undermine
mainstream views about antitrust, see Baker, Recent Developments in
Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, supra note 6, 645 n.1,
per se rules reflecting Chicago school thinking may be called into ques-
tion.
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The current debate over the proper formulation of per se rules
applying to horizontal restraints began when the Supreme Court
decided BMI, over a decade ago. In that decision the Court, influ-
enced by the new economic analysis, recognized that the large
efficiencies created by the horizontal restraint under review made
it inappropriate to apply the longstanding per se prohibition.
Although the Court has analyzed horizontal restraints several
times since it decided BMI,31 it remains unclear whether the BMI
exception applies only when efficiencies are so large that it is as
if a new product has been created, 32 whether BMI mandates a
complex structured inquiry of the form suggested by the antitrust
enforcement agencies, 33 or whether BMI requires an unstructured
reasonableness analysis2 4
Denis argues that recent precedents are consistent with the
most conservative interpretation of BMI-that BMI does no more
than create a new product exception. Under this rule, a horizontal
practice that threatens market power on its face will not receive
rule of reason review unless the practice plausibly leads to a sub-
stantial efficiency manifested in the creation of a new product;
otherwise, the practice is prohibited without examining its reason-
ableness. Langenfeld and Morris, in contrast, accept the FTC
31 The most recent decisions are Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 401 (1990); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assoc., 110 S. Ct.
768 (1990).
32 Accord, NCAA at 101, 103; cf. Denis, supra note 2, at 649 (the BMI
exception requires that the price restraint create both a new product and
genuine economic integration).
33 Mass. Board (FTC policy); U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 16 (DOJ
policy). The BMI Court pointed out that mergers and joint ventures com-
prise another class of horizontal restraints that are not considered illegal per
se. BMI, 441 S. Ct. at 23. These restraints are instead subject to a structured
inquiry under the rule of reason pursuant to Clayton Act § 7, Philadelphia
NationalBank, and to similar standards under Sherman Act § 1.
3 Cf. Muris, supra note 5 (all horizontal restraints are now reviewed
under the rule of reason, although the reasonableness review is structured
and circumscribed for those practices that are inherently suspect).
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view that BMI and its descendants require a structured inquiry
more complex than those envisioned by older per se rules.
Under this approach, a horizontal practice that threatens market
power on its face will be reviewed under the rule of reason
merely on a showing that a substantial efficiency justification is
plausible, regardless of whether that efficiency takes the form
of the creation of a new product.
At stake in this dispute is the treatment of horizontal agree-
ments involving price that generate substantial efficiencies
without creating new products. These practices may include
many of the association rules addressed by the model of
Langenfeld and Morris.35 Such horizontal restraints threaten
to facilitate the exercise of market power, but they may
simultaneously offer benefits to consumers and producers and
they do not necessarily involve the creation of new products.3 6
They would receive per se rule treatment under the narrow
interpretation of BAI, and rule of reason treatment under a
broader view.
If economic efficiency is the Chicago school lodestar, as is
frequently suggested, the interpretation of BMI limiting the
exemption from the per se rule to horizontal restraints that cre-
ate new products seems too narrow. A less tendentious view of
the new mainstream consensus, sweeping beyond Chicago
school partisans, is that vertical restraints and nonprice
restraints tend to be procompetitive, while horizontal restraints
35 Potential efficiency justifications for horizontal restraints
among real estate brokers, for example, are cataloged in Lopatka &
Simons, Real Estate Multiple Listing Services and Antitrust Revisited
in ELECTRONIC SERVICES NETWORKS: A BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
CHALLENGE (M. Guerin-Calvert & S. Wildman, eds. 1991).
36 In the leading work clarifying the implications of the Chicago
school approach to antitrust for legal doctrine, Judge Bork empha-
sized that price-fixing agreements are frequently ancillary to effi-
ciency-enhancing economic integration. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 263-79 (1978).
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and restraints bearing on price tend to be anticompetitive.3 7 If
this alternative view is correct, the narrow interpretation of
BMI will likely persist.38
37 From a less interventionist perspective, this generalization under-
states the extent to which horizontal practices may create beneficial effi-
ciencies. From a more interventionist perspective, this generalization
understates the extent to which vertical practices may harm competition,
as by creating market power through "raising rivals' costs."
38 From a law and economics perspective, in contrast, the choice
between the two interpretations turns on the observation expense and
manipulability of the alternative criteria for removing a horizontal
restraint on price from a per se prohibition. See supra note 29. The nar-
row interpretation of BMI, that a new product is required, will persist if
new products created by price restraints are more cheaply observable
than the wider requirement of an economic integration, and if fins seek-
ing to exercise market power are less capable of evading per se treatment
by creating the misleading appearance of satisfying the former standard
than the latter one.
